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Abstract
Dynamic TU-games are considered which consist of a finite player set, a finite se-
quence of TU-games and a profile of intertemporal utility functions. At every stage a
(restrictively) additive solution is applied to the TU-game, which results in a stream
of payoff distributions, evaluated by the intertemporal utility functions of the play-
ers. Players are able to transfer payoffs between stages. The strategic possibilities
from individual transfers between periods are modeled by a noncooperative game.
Conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in this noncooperative game exists, are
established. It is shown when a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is Pareto
optimal.
Keywords: Cooperative games, Dynamic games.
JEL Codes: C71, C73
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility is characterized by a function which gives
each coalition of players a nonnegative worth. This game describes a one-time event.
However, in reality events happen repeatedly over time or are related to earlier events, e.g.
treaty and contract negotiations. This is captured by a dynamic cooperative game with
transferable utility, where at every stage a cooperative game with transferable utility is
played. Furthermore, every player has a utility function to enable him to evaluate a stream
of payoff distributions. A solution is applied to the dynamic game and gives a (set of) payoff
distribution(s) for every time period. In this paper, additive and restrictively additive
solutions are considered. The well-known Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is an example of
∗The author would like to thank Hans Peters for helpful comments.
†Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 43 3883835, email: c.berden@ke.unimaas.nl
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a (restrictively) additive solution. The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and prenucleolus are
restrictively additive solutions which are explored in more detail.
Some assumptions are made about the dynamic game. First, the player set remains the
same in every stage game within the dynamic cooperative game. Another assumption is
that the sequence of stage games is exogenously determined. The time horizon is assumed
to be finite and time is considered to be discrete.1 Particular intertemporal utility functions
are considered that value time periods closer to the present more than time periods further
away from the present. An example is discounted utility (Fishburn et al., 1982), which is
well-known in literature and often used in economics.
In real life situations events are often history dependent. This aspect can be modeled in a
dynamic game by letting the stage games and/or solutions over these stage games depend
on the history of play. Filar and Petrosjan (2000) consider dynamic games in which the
stage games depend on payoffs that are obtained in earlier periods. In particular they focus
on solutions which are time consistent to the stage games. The present paper is based on
Kranich et al. (2000) who assume that the sequence of stage games is given. The authors
develop theoretical tools to analyze dynamic games and discuss the possibility of borrowing
and saving over time by introducing individual and aggregate transfers. Although the
sequence of stage games before any payoffs are transferred is exogenously determined,
transfers change the stage games endogenously.
The idea of borrowing and saving is implemented in the model described in this paper
and players are allowed to individually transfer payoffs between stage games within the
dynamic game. The following two transfer systems are considered. In the first system an
individual transfer only influences the individual worths of stage games within a dynamic
game. In contrast, in the second system an individual transfer also influences all worths of
coalitions over time which contain the individual. We make the assumption that the change
of a coalition’s worth equals the sum of the changes of the individual worths of players
contained in the coalition. To ensure that the worths of coalitions remain nonnegative under
the second transfer system, only dynamic cooperative games with weakly superadditive
stage games are considered. In a weakly superadditive game the worth of a coalition is at
least equal to the sum of the individual worths of individuals contained in the coalition.
The strategic possibilities which result from individual intertemporal payoff transfers are
modeled by a noncooperative game, which depends on the underlying dynamic cooperative
game, a solution concept and a transfer system.
The paper is concerned with finding conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists
in the above described noncooperative game. In Theorem 4 existence is proven for both
transfer systems in case the solution is continuous and transfer-k-concave and the intertem-
poral utility functions of the dynamic game are continuous, increasing and quasi-concave.
These assumptions ensure that the utility functions of the associated noncooperative game
are continuous and quasi-concave, which are two of the sufficient conditions under which
1The above mentioned assumptions are also made in a paper by Kranich, et al. (2005) in which different
core concepts for dynamic games with transferable utility are considered.
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Debreu (1952) proved existence of a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game. Example
4 illustrates that a Nash equilibrium does not have to exist in case the nucleolus is applied
to a dynamic cooperative game where payoffs are transferred according to the first transfer
system. This is consistent with the fact that the nucleolus is not transfer-1-concave, i.e. the
nucleolus is not concave under the first transfer system. Therefore not all utility functions
of the associated noncooperative game are quasi-concave. Hence, transfer-k-concavity of
the solution cannot be dropped from the theorem. Additionally, it is shown that a Nash
equilibrium in dominant strategies exists if the intertemporal utility functions of the dy-
namic game value the present more than the future and one of two instances are met: (i)
payoffs are transferred according to the first transfer system, the solution is additive and
some other specific conditions on the solution hold or (ii) payoffs are transferred according
to the second transfer system, the dynamic game only consists of weakly superadditive
cooperative games, the solution is restrictively additive and another specific condition on
the solution hold. In this special type of Nash equilibrium players transfer as much payoff
as possible to the present. Under particular conditions this Nash equilibrium is shown to
be Pareto optimal.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main def-
initions. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 is devoted to Pareto optimality.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A game with transferable utility (TU-game) consists of a pair (N, v) where N := {1, . . . , n}
denotes the set of players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function which assigns to
each coalition S ⊆ N the worth v(S), such that v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N and v(∅) = 0.
In the remainder we omit N from notation and simply write v. The set of all TU-games
with player set N is denoted by GN . A game v ∈ GN is additive if v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T )
for all disjoint S, T ⊆ N . Hence, the additive game v ∈ GN is generated by the vector
(v(1), . . . , v(n)) ∈ RN . A game v ∈ GN is weakly superadditive in case v(S) ≥ ∑i∈S v(i)
for all S ⊆ N . The zero-game is denoted by z ∈ GN .
Definition 1: Let T ∈ N. A dynamic TU-game Γ is a pair (v,u) where
(i) v = (v1, . . . , vT ) ∈ (GN)T .
(ii) u = (u1, . . . , un) where, for each i ∈ N , ui : RT → R.
The function ui assigns to every payoff stream x ∈ RT of player i utility level ui(x). If for
all x,y ∈ RT with x > y 2 it holds that ui(x) ≥ ui(y) [ui(x) > ui(y)], then ui is [strictly]
increasing. The function ui is quasi-concave if for all x, y ∈ RT and λ ∈ (0, 1) it holds that
ui(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{ui(x), ui(y)}.
2The vector inequality x > y is to be understood as xt ≥ yt for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and xt > yt for at
least one t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
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In order to define a special class of intertemporal utility functions, the vector et ∈ RT is
defined which has a 1 for the element on place t and zeros for all other elements.
Definition 2: The class V [class V¯ ] contains intertemporal utility functions u : RT → R
with the property that for all x,y ∈ RT , all t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , T} and  > 0 it holds that if
t < t′ and x = y + et − et′ , then u(x) ≥ u(y) [u(x) > u(y)].
Clearly, V¯ ⊂ V. The well-known and in economics often used class of discounted utility
is contained in the class V . According to discounted utility, the utility level of a payoff
in a payoff stream when received immediately is multiplied with a discount factor that
corresponds to the time of receival of the payoff. This procedure is repeated for every
payoff within the stream and generates discounted payoffs. All these discounted payoffs
are summed in order to obtain the level of discounted utility of a payoff stream. The next
lemma characterizes differentiable utility functions in V .
Lemma 1 For all utility functions u : RT → R for which the partial derivatives exist and
are continuous and u′t(x) ≥ 0 3 for all t and all x ∈ RT , we have u ∈ V if and only if
u′t(x) ≥ u′t′(x) for every x ∈ RT and all t < t′.
Proof. Let t < t′ and yη := y+ ηet − ηet′ for all y ∈ RT and η > 0. Let  > 0 and define
the function f : [0, ]→ R by f : η 7→ u(yη). Then, using the chain rule,
u(y)− u(y0) = f()− f(0)
=
∫ 
0
f ′(η)dη =
∫ 
0
[
∂u(yη)
∂η
]
dη
=
∫ 
0
[ T∑
s=1
u′s(yη) · ∂y
s
η
∂η
]
dη
=
∫ 
0
[
u′t(yη) · 1 + u′t′(yη) · −1
]
dη. (1)
(i) To prove the ’only if’ part, assume u ∈ V and let t < t′. Suppose contrary to what has
to be proven that u′t(z) < u
′
t′(z) for some z ∈ RT . Define Bθ(z) as the θ-neighborhood of
the vector z for θ > 0. Because of continuity of the partial derivatives, there exists a θ > 0
such that u′t(z
′) < u′t′(z
′) for all z′ ∈ Bθ(z). Choose y ∈ RT and  > 0 in such a way that
yη ∈ Bθ(z) for every η ∈ [0, ], then by (1) it follows that u(y) − u(y0) < 0, which is a
contradiction to u ∈ V .
(ii) For the converse suppose that u′t(x) ≥ u′t′(x) for all x ∈ RT . From (1) it then follows
that u(y)− u(y0) ≥ 0, hence u ∈ V . 
A value ψ : GN → RN assigns to a TU-game v ∈ GN the vector ψ(v). The value ψ is additive
if for all v, w ∈ GN it holds that ψ(v+w) = ψ(v) +ψ(w). In case ψ(v+w) = ψ(v) +ψ(w)
holds for all v, w ∈ GN where w is additive, a weaker form of additivity of ψ is considered.
The value ψ is restrictively additive if for all v, w ∈ GN where w is an additive game
3The notation u′t(x) denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to the t-th coordinate.
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generated by w¯ = (w(1), . . . , w(n)) ∈ RN it holds that ψ(v + w) = ψ(v) + w¯. Hence,
restricted additivity is a combination of the above mentioned weaker form of additivity and
the condition that ψ(w) = w¯ for all additive games w generated by w¯ = (w(1), . . . , w(n)).
As a result restricted additivity is not necessarily weaker than additivity. For every i ∈ N ,
ψi is concave if for all v, w ∈ GN and λ ∈ (0, 1) it holds that ψi(λv + (1 − λ)w) ≥
λψi(v) + (1− λ)ψi(w). For i ∈ T ⊆ N , ψi is [strictly] decreasing in the worth of coalition
T if ψi(v) ≤ ψi(v′) [ψi(v) < ψi(v′)] for all v, v′ ∈ GN with v(T ) > v′(T ) and v(S) = v′(S)
for all S 6= T . The function ψi is [strictly] increasing in the worth of coalition T if −ψi is
[strictly] decreasing in the worth of coalition T .
The games 1T , 2T ∈ GN for T ⊂ N are defined as follows. The game 1T has worth 1T (S) = 1
if S = T and 1T (S) = 0 otherwise and the game 2T has worths 2T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and
2T (S) = 0 otherwise. Note that the game 2T is the usual unanimity game on T .
Clearly, the game 2i
4 for i ∈ N is an additive game generated by the vector e¯i ∈ RN which
has a 1 for the element on place i and zeros for all other elements. In case ψ is restrictively
additive and ψi(z) = 0 for every i ∈ N it follows that ψ(α2i) = αe¯i for every i ∈ N and
all α ∈ R. Thus, ψi(α2i) = α and ψj(α2i) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N , j 6= i and α ∈ R.
Lemma 2
(i) Let ψ be additive and let ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N , then ψi(α1i) = αψi(1i) for every
i ∈ N and all α ∈ Q.
(ii) If additionally, ψi is continuous in v(i) for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN , then ψi(α1i) =
αψi(1i) for every i ∈ N and all α ∈ R.
Proof. (i) Let i ∈ N and write ψi(1i) = r. By additivity of ψ and ψi(z) = 0 we have
ψi(−1i) + ψi(1i) = ψi(−1i + 1i) = ψi(z) = 0. Hence, ψi(−1i) = −ψi(1i) = −r. By
additivity it then holds that ψi(k1i) = kψi(1i) = kr for k ∈ N and in a similar way
ψi(−k1i) = kψi(−1i) = −kr. For pq ∈ Q , ψi(pq1i) = 1q qψi(pq1i) = 1qψi(pq q1i) = 1qψi(p1i) =
1
q
pψi(1i) =
p
q
r. Thus, ψi(α1i) = αψi(1i) for all α ∈ Q.
(ii) let ψi be continuous in v(i) for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN , which implies ψi(α1i) is
continuous in α. Combining this with part (i) it follows that ψi(α1i) = αψi(1i) for all
α ∈ R. 
Instead of continuity in Lemma 2(ii), also monotonicity can be used.
Lemma 3 Let ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Let ψ be additive and let ψi be increasing in v(i)
for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN . Then ψi(α1i) = αψi(1i) for every i ∈ N and all α ∈ R.
Proof. For α ∈ R, there exist p
q
, p
′
q′ ∈ Q with p, q, p′, q′ ∈ Z such that pq < α < p
′
q′ . Since
ψi is increasing in v(i) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN , it follows that ψi(α1i) is increasing in
4For simplicity a coalition is written without curly braces, e.g. ij is written instead of {i, j} for i, j ∈ N .
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α. Since ψi(z) = 0, as a result ψi(1i) ≥ 0. From Lemma 2(i) and because pq < α < p
′
q′ it
follows that ψi(
p
q
1i) =
p
q
ψi(1i) ≤ ψi(α1i) ≤ p′q′ψi(1i) = ψi(p
′
q′ 1i). The fractions
p
q
, p
′
q′ can be
chosen very close to α, such that p
q
approaches α from below and p
′
q′ approaches α from
above. Thus, ψi(α1i) = αψi(1i) for all α ∈ R. 
In the next section a solution ψ is applied to dynamic TU-games. This means that ψ is ap-
plied to every TU-game within the dynamic TU-game separately. Individual intertemporal
transfers are introduced which influence the exogenously determined dynamic TU-game.
The strategies resulting from individual intertemporal transfers are modeled in a noncoop-
erative game. Lemma 3 is used to find possible dominant strategies of this noncooperative
game.
3 Individual Intertemporal Transfers and Nash Equi-
libria
In this section it is assumed that players can make individual transfers between TU-games
within a dynamic game, by which they can affect their intertemporal payoffs. If a player
makes an individual transfer he transfers payoff over time: this payoff transfer affects cer-
tain worths in time which can have an affect on the intertemporal payoffs of the players. We
assume that there is no discounting involved with these transfers, although the intertem-
poral utility function with which players evaluate their payoffs can be discounted utility.
One way to think about this is that each player possesses a quantity of some good which
does not loose its quality over time and can be stored. It can be transferred over time and
still maintain its quality, however the utility which players receive from its consumption
can change, in particular decrease, over time.
Two transfer systems are distinguished. Under the first transfer system, a player can
transfer payoffs over time which only change the player’s individual worths. In other words,
by using a transfer a player can redistribute his individual worths over time. If payoffs
are transferred according to the second transfer system, a player’s transfer does not only
change his individual worths, but also the worths of all coalitions that contain this player.
In this latter system we assume that in a TU-game an individual transfer ceteris paribus
changes all worths of coalitions which contain the individual by an amount equal to the
individual transfer. This means that within a TU-game the change of a coalition’s worth
equals the sum of the changes of the relevant individual worths. In order to ensure that the
worths of all coalitions remain nonnegative under the second transfer system, only dynamic
games with weakly superadditive TU-games are considered. Although it is possible to
impose a less stringent condition to guarantee nonnegativity of all TU-games, we use weak
superadditivity to ensure that the strategy set of a player under the first transfer system
equals the strategy set of the player under the second transfer system. By imposing weak
superadditivity it follows that the worth of a coalition consists of the individual worths of
the players which are contained in the coalition and a nonnegative worth generated by a
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nonnegative synergy resulting from the fact that players work together. The interpretation
that the worth of a coalition thus can be seen as a transferable part namely the individual
worths of the relevant players and a nontransferable part which is the worth resulting from
a nonnegative synergy, supports the second transfer system.
Definition 3: With each Γ = (v,u) and value ψ we associate for k ∈ {1, 2} the nonco-
operative game Gk(Γ, ψ) = (S1, . . . ,Sn; u˜1, . . . , u˜n) with the extra condition that if k = 2
then vt ∈ GN is weakly superadditive for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. For every i ∈ N ,
(i) strategy set Si = {αi ∈ RT | vt(i) + αti ≥ 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and
∑T
t=1 α
t
i = 0}.
(ii) utility function u˜i : SN 5 → R where
- for k = 1 it holds that
u˜i(α1, . . . , αn) = ui
(
ψi(v
1 +
∑n
j=1 α
1
j1j), . . . , ψi(v
T +
∑n
j=1 α
T
j 1j)
)
.
- for k = 2 it holds that
u˜i
(
α1, . . . , αn) = ui(ψi(v
1 +
∑n
j=1 α
1
j2j), . . . , ψi(v
T +
∑n
j=1 α
T
j 2j)
)
.
Nash equilibria of the noncooperative game Gk(Γ, ψ) for k ∈ {1, 2} are the main interest of
this paper. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
n) ∈ SN such that for each
i ∈ N it holds that u˜i(αi, α∗N\i) ≤ u˜i(α∗i , α∗N\i) for all αi ∈ Si. However, a Nash equilibrium
does not have to exist as Example 4 later shows.
First, attention is given to weakly and strictly dominant strategies. A strategy α∗i ∈ Si of
player i is weakly dominant if u˜i(α
∗
i , αN\i) ≥ u˜i(αi, αN\i) for all αi ∈ Si and all αN\i ∈ SN\i.
If u˜i(α
∗
i , αN\i) > u˜i(αi, αN\i) for all αi ∈ Si and all αN\i ∈ SN\i, then α∗i ∈ Si is player i’s
strictly dominant strategy. Observe that a combination of weakly dominant strategies is
a Nash equilibrium. If these strategies are strictly dominant then this Nash equilibrium is
unique.
Theorem 1 Let Γ = (v,u) be a dynamic game and let ψ be additive. Let i ∈ N and let
ψi(z) = 0.
(i) If ui ∈ V and if ψi is increasing in v(i) for all v ∈ GN , then(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is a weakly dominant strategy for player i in G1(Γ, ψ).
(ii) If ui ∈ V¯ and if ψi is strictly increasing in v(i) for all v ∈ GN , then(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is player i’s strictly dominant strategy in G1(Γ, ψ).
Proof. (i) Let ψi be increasing in v(i) for all v ∈ GN . To determine player i’s dominant
strategies, player i is fixed and the strategies of all other players N \ i are considered to
be given. Without loss of generality it is assumed that the game vt ∈ GN for every t
includes the transfers resulting from all strategies of players N \ i. By additivity of ψ we
can assume without loss of generality that vt = z for all t. Because ψi is increasing in v(i)
5ST = ×i∈TSi for all T ⊆ N
7
for all v ∈ GN and ψi(z) = 0, it follows that ψi(1i) ≥ 0. From Lemma 3 it follows that
ui
(
ψi(v
1 + α1i 1i), . . . , ψi(v
T + αTi 1i)
)
= ui
(
α1iψi(1i), . . . , α
T
i ψi(1i)
)
for all αi ∈ Si.
Take two arbitrary strategies β, γ ∈ Si with βt − γt ≤ 0 for all t 6= 1. Then it follows that
ui
(
β1ψi(1i), . . . , β
Tψi(1i)
)
= ui
(
ψi(1i)(β
1, . . . , βT )
)
≥ ui
(
ψi(1i)(β
1, . . . , βT−1 + (βT − γT ), γT ))
...
≥ ui
(
ψi(1i)(β
1 +
T∑
t=2
(βt − γt), . . . , γT ))
= ui
(
ψi(1i)(γ
1, . . . , γT )
)
. (2)
The first equality follows from scalar multiplication. The first inequality follows from
ui ∈ V and because (βT − γT )ψi(1i) ≤ 0. The dots represent the second till the penul-
timate inequality. The second inequality follows from ui ∈ V and because (βT−1 −
γT−1)ψi(1i) ≤ 0, etc. The equality at the end follows from
∑T
t=1 β
t =
∑T
t=1 γ
t = 0.
Because β, γ ∈ Si it holds that βt, γt ≥ −vt(i) for all t. Choose (β1, β2, . . . , βT ) =(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)), then (2) holds for all γ ∈ Si because βt − γt ≤ 0 for
all t 6= 1. As a result (∑Tt=2 vt(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is a weakly dominant strategy for
player i in G1(Γ, ψ).
(ii) Let ψi be strictly increasing in v(i) for all v ∈ GN , then ψi(1i) > 0 since ψi(z) = 0. The
remainder of the proof of part (ii) follows the proof of part (i), however we take two arbi-
trary strategies β, γ ∈ Si with βt−γt ≤ 0 for all t 6= 1 and βt−γt < 0 for at least one t 6= 1.
Because ui ∈ V¯ it then follows that at least one of the inequality signs (≥) in (2) should
be replaced by a strict inequality sign (>). As a result
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is
player i’s strictly dominant strategy in G1(Γ, ψ). 
Theorem 1 shows that the strategy to transfer as much payoff as possible to the first time
period is a weakly dominant strategy for player i. The next theorem shows in which case
the condition ψi is increasing in the individual worth of player i is a necessary condition.
Theorem 2 Let i ∈ N , let ui : RT → R and let ui ∈ V. Let ψ be additive, let ψi(z) = 0
and let ψi be continuous in v(i) for all v ∈ GN . Then, if
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is
a weakly dominant strategy of player i for all Γ = (v,u) in G1(Γ, ψ), then ψi is increasing
in v(i) for all v ∈ GN .
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and let (∑Tt=2 vt(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) be a weakly dominant strategy
of player i in G1(Γ, ψ) for all Γ = (v,u). Suppose that there exist v, v
′ ∈ GN with
v(i) > v′(i), v(S) = v′(S) for all S 6= {i} and ψi(v) < ψi(v′). By additivity of ψ and since
ψ is continuous in the individual worth of player i it follows that
(
v(i)− v′(i))ψi(1i) < 0,
hence ψi(1i) < 0. Therefore it follows for every w,w
′ ∈ GN with w(i) > w′(i) and w(S) =
w′(S) = v(S) for every S 6= {i} that ψi(w) = w(i)ψi(1i) < w′(i)ψi(1i) = ψi(w′). Take
w,w′ with w(i) = 1, w′(i) = 0 and w(S) = w′(S) = v(S) for every S 6= {i}. Consider the
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sequence of stage games (w,w′, z, . . . , z) ∈ (GN)T . In this case (w′(i),−w′(i), 0, . . . , 0) =
(0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Si is a weakly dominant strategy of player i. It follows that
ui
(
ψi(w), ψi(w
′), ψi(z), . . . , ψi(z)
)
≥ ui
(
ψi(w + (w
′(i)− w(i))1i), ψi(w′ − (w′(i)− w(i))1i), . . . , ψi(z)
)
= ui
(
ψi(w
′), ψi(w), ψi(z), . . . , ψi(z)
)
. (3)
Inequality (3) is true only if
(
w′(i) − w(i))ψi(1i) ≤ 0, which is a contradiction since
w′(i)−w(i) = −1 and ψi(1i) < 0. Therefore ψi(w) ≥ ψi(w′). Thus, ψi is increasing in w(i)
for all w ∈ GN . 
In the next theorem we consider noncooperative game G2(Γ, ψ) in which an individual
intertemporal transfer influences all worths of coalitions which contain the individual. We
assume that within a TU-game the change of a coalition’s worth equals the sum of the
amounts of the relevant individual transfers. This means that in case the individual trans-
fers at time t are denoted by αti ∈ Si for all i ∈ N , then all worths of coalitions S ⊆ N
change with
∑
i∈S α
t
i at t. Hence, the worth of coalition S ⊆ N at t after transfers are
applied equals vt(S)+
∑
i∈N α
t
i2i(S), where v
t(S) is the worth before payoffs are transferred
and
∑
i∈N α
t
i2i is an additive game generated by the vector (α
t
1, . . . , α
t
n) ∈ RN . Because
an additive game is generated by the individual intertemporal transfers of the players, a
restrictively additive solution can be used in the next theorem to obtain a weakly dominant
strategy for player i.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (v,u) be a dynamic game, let vt ∈ GN be weakly superadditive for
all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and let ψ be restrictively additive. Let i ∈ N and let ψi(z) = 0.
(i) If ui ∈ V, then
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is a weakly dominant strategy for
player i in G2(Γ, ψ).
(ii) If ui ∈ V¯, then
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is player i’s strictly dominant strategy
in G2(Γ, ψ).
Proof. (i) Fix player i. For all α ∈ SN it holds that ψi(vt +
∑N
j=1 α
t
j2j) = ψi(v
t) + αti for
all j ∈ N and all t, because ψ is restrictively additive and ψi(z) = 0. Take two arbitrary
strategies β, γ ∈ Si with βt − γt ≤ 0 for t 6= 1. Then it follows that
ui
(
ψi(v
1) + β1, . . . , ψi(v
T ) + βT
)
≥ ui
(
ψi(v
1) + β1, . . . , ψi(v
T−1) + βT−1 + βT − γT , ψi(vT ) + γT
)
...
≥ ui
(
ψi(v
1) + β1 +
T∑
t=2
(βt − γt), ψi(v2) + γ2, . . . , ψi(vT ) + γT
)
= ui
(
ψi(v
1) + γ1, . . . , ψi(v
T ) + γT
)
. (4)
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The first inequality follows from ui ∈ V and since βT − γT ≤ 0. The vertical dots represent
the second till the penultimate inequality. The second inequality follows from ui ∈ V and
because βT−1 − γT−1 ≤ 0, etc. The last inequality follows from ui ∈ V and β2 − γ2 ≤ 0.
Finally, the equality follows because
∑T
t=1 β
t =
∑T
t=1 γ
t = 0. Since β, γ ∈ Si and vt ∈ GN
is weakly superadditive for all t, it follows that βt, γt ≥ −vt(i) for all i ∈ N and all t.
Hence, if (β1, β2, . . . , βT ) is chosen equal to
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)), then for all
γ ∈ Si it follows that (4) holds, since βt − γt ≤ 0 for t 6= 1. From (4) it follows that(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is a weakly dominant strategy for player i in G2(Γ, ψ).
(ii) The proof of part (ii) follows the line of proof of part (i), however take βt − γt ≤ 0 for
all t 6= 1 and βt− γt < 0 for at least one t 6= 1. Because ui ∈ V¯ it then follows that at least
one of the inequality signs (≥) in (4) should be replaced by a strict inequality sign (>). In
a similar way as in part (i) we then find that
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is player i’s
strictly dominant strategy in G2(Γ, ψ). 
If the assumption vt(S) − maxt′∈{1,...,T}
∑
j∈S v
t′(j) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N is imposed on
vt ∈ GN for all t in Theorem 3 instead of the stricter condition of weakly superadditivity
on vt ∈ GN for all t, then it does not have to be true that (∑Tt=2 vt(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i))
is contained in player i’s newly obtained strategy set. However, in case ui ∈ V it follows
that a strategy, contained in this newly obtained strategy set of player i, where as much as
possible is transferred to the first time period is a weakly dominant strategy for player i.
In case ui ∈ V¯ transferring as much as possible to the first time period is player i’s strictly
dominant strategy.
Obviously, if the conditions in Theorems 1 and 3 apply to all players, then there is at least
one Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. In this equilibrium all players transfer as
much payoff as possible to the first time period. However, players do not have to value the
same time period as most important. If for some (or all) players the first time period is
not as important as another time period, then a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is
obtained in which every player transfers as much payoff as possible to his most important
time period.
In Theorem 3 a restrictively additive solution is considered. The nucleolus and prenucleolus
are restrictively additive. Specifically, they are covariant (Peleg and Sudho¨lter, 2003). The
nucleolus is a one-point payoff distribution which is defined for games in GN with a non-
empty imputation set. The imputation set contains all payoffs which are efficient and
individually rational for all players. If the core of a game is nonempty then the nucleolus
is in the core. In case the core is nonempty, the nucleolus and prenucleolus coincide. The
prenucleolus is also defined if the imputation set is empty. As a matter of fact, it always
exists.
Both solutions are defined as the solution of a minimization problem, where excesses of all
nonempty coalitions of a game are lexicographically minimized. The excess of a coalition
S in game v ∈ GN given a payoff vector x = (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ RN is defined as v(S) −∑
i∈S x(i) for all v ∈ GN . The nucleolus as well as the prenucleolus satisfy the efficiency
property, i.e.
∑
i∈N x(i) = v(N). Additionally, the nucleolus satisfies the property of
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individual rationality for all players which means that x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N .6
If the (pre)nucleolus is applied to the dynamic game Γ = (v,u) where ui ∈ V for player
i ∈ N , then transferring as much payoff as possible to the first time period is a weakly
dominant strategy of player i in case payoffs are transferred according to the second transfer
system. However, as the following example illustrates, this implication does not have to
hold in case the first transfer system is used. In particular it is shown that transferring as
much as possible to t = 1 is not at all beneficial for player i.
Example 1. Consider the dynamic TU-game Γ = (v1, v2;u1, u2, u3) and transfer system
k = 1. The game v1 is defined as follows: v1(1) = 0; v1(2) = 2; v1(3) = 3; v1(12) = 4;
v1(13) = v1(23) = 5 and v1(N) = 7, and the game v2 has v2(1) = 1; v2(2) = v2(3) = 0;
v2(12) = v2(13) = v2(23) = 2 and v2(N) = 4. The functions u1, u2 and u3 are respectively
player 1, player 2 and player 3’s intertemporal utility functions. Furthermore ν(v1) =
(2, 2, 3) and ν(v2) = (3
2
, 5
4
, 5
4
). Suppose that player 1 transfers α = (1,−1), which means
that he transfers the maximum amount of payoff possible to his first time period. Then
the games v1 + α111 and v
2 + α211 are obtained and accordingly ν(v
1 + 1 · 11) = (2, 2, 3)
and ν(v2− 1 · 11) = (43 , 43 , 43). Thus, player 1 receives payoff 2 in the first period and payoff
3
2
in the second, before any transfer is made. After he makes the transfer α = (1,−1),
he receives a payoff equal to 2 in the first period and only a payoff of 4
3
in the second
period. Under any reasonable utility function, transferring (1,−1) is clearly not beneficial
for player 1.
Since the cores of the TU-games v1 and v2 in example 1 are nonempty before as well as
after player 1 has made a transfer, the prenucleolus and nucleolus coincide. Therefore this
example also applies to the prenucleolus. In example 2, the first transfer system is applied
to the dynamic game Γ = (v,u) over which the nucleolus is calculated to show that an
extreme strategy profile (i.e a strategy profile where all payoff is transferred to either the
first time period or the last time period) does not have to be a Nash equilibrium. As
in example 1 the cores for the TU-games v1 and v2 before as well as after payoffs are
transferred are nonempty and therefore the nucleolus and prenucleolus coincide.
Example 2. The dynamic TU-game Γ = (v1, v2;u1, u2, u3) is considered over which
the first transfer system is applied and where u1, u2 and u3 are respectively player 1,
player 2 and player 3’s intertemporal utility functions. The function u1 is a constant
discounted utility function with discount factor 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The game v1 is described by
v1(1) = v1(2) = v1(3) = 0 and v1(12) = v1(13) = v1(23) = 2
3
and v1(N) = 3. The game v2
is defined as v2(1) = 2 and v2(S) = v1(S) for all S 6= {1}. Clearly only player 1 can make
transfers between the two time periods, which are denoted by α ∈ R2 where α1 + α2 = 0
and α2 ≥ −2.
6See Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) for more information about the nucleolus and prenucleolus.
11
α1 ν(v1 + α111) ν(v
2 + α211)
0 (1, 1, 1) (21
6
, 5
12
, 5
12
)
1 (12
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
) (12
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
)
2 (21
6
, 5
12
, 5
12
) (1, 1, 1)
Table 1: Computation of nucleoli for different transfers.
Utility function u1(ν(v
1 +α111), ν(v
2 +α211)) = ν(v
1 +α111) + δν(v
2 +α211) is contained
in the class V for δ ≤ 1. If 3
4
< δ ≤ 1, then none of the two extreme transfers α1 = 0 and
α1 = 2 give player 1 the highest possible utility.
Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game with
finitely many players, whose strategy sets are convex and compact subsets of a Euclidian
space and whose utility functions are continuous and quasi-concave. To apply Debreu’s
theorem to the noncooperative game Gk(Γ, ψ) for k ∈ {1, 2} extra conditions are necessary
in order to prove existence.
The value ψ is transfer-1-concave if ψi
(
λ(v + w) + (1 − λ)(v + w′)) ≥ λψi(v + w) + (1 −
λ)ψi(v + w
′) for all i ∈ N and all v, w, w′ ∈ GN where for (w(1), . . . , w(n)) ∈ RN and(
w′(1), . . . , w′(n)
) ∈ RN we have w = ∑ni=1w(i)1i and w′ = ∑ni=1w′(i)1i. The value ψ
is transfer-2-concave if ψi
(
λ(v + w) + (1 − λ)(v + w′)) ≥ λψi(v + w) + (1 − λ)ψi(v + w′)
for all i ∈ N and all v, w, w′ ∈ GN where w, w′ are additive, generated by respectively(
w(1), . . . , w(n)
) ∈ RN and (w′(1), . . . , w′(n)) ∈ RN which means that w = ∑ni=1w(i)2i
and w′ =
∑n
i=1w
′(i)2i.
Lemma 4 Let i ∈ N and let k ∈ {1, 2}. If ψ is transfer-k-concave and ui is an increasing
and quasi-concave function, then u˜i is quasi-concave.
Proof. (i) Let ψ be transfer-1-concave. This means that for all β, γ ∈ SN and λ ∈ (0, 1)
it holds that ψi
(
λ(vt+
∑n
j=1 β
t
j1j)+ (1−λ)(vt+
∑n
j=1 γ
t
j1j)
) ≥ λψi(vt+∑nj=1 βtj1j)+ (1−
λ)ψi(v
t +
∑n
j=1 γ
t
j1j) for all t and all i ∈ N . Then,
u˜i
(
λβ + (1− λ)γ) = ui(ψi(v1 + n∑
j=1
[λβ1j + (1− λ)γ1j ]1j), . . . , ψi(vT +
n∑
j=1
[λβTj + (1− λ)γTj ]1j)
)
= ui
(
ψi(λ[v1 +
n∑
j=1
β1j 1j ] + (1− λ)[v1 +
n∑
j=1
γ1j 1j ]), . . .
. . . , ψi(λ[vT +
n∑
j=1
βTj 1j ] + (1− λ)[vT +
n∑
j=1
γTj 1j ])
)
≥ ui
(
λψi(v1 +
n∑
j=1
β1j 1j) + (1− λ)ψi(v1 +
n∑
j=1
γ1j 1j), . . .
. . . , λψi(vT +
n∑
j=1
βTj 1j) + (1− λ)ψi(vT +
n∑
j=1
γTj 1j)
)
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≥ min{ui
(
ψi(v1 +
n∑
j=1
β1j 1j), . . . , ψi(v
T +
n∑
j=1
βTj 1j)
)
,
ui
(
ψi(v1 +
n∑
j=1
γ1j 1j), . . . , ψi(v
T +
n∑
j=1
γTj 1j)
)}
= min{u˜i(β), u˜i(γ)}.
The first equality follows from the definition of u˜i. The first inequality follows from transfer-
1-concavity of ψ and because ui is an increasing function. The second inequality follows
from quasi-concavity of ui. Finally, the last equality follows from the definition of u˜i.
(ii) Let ψ be transfer-2-concave. Then 1j in part (i) is replaced by 2j. In an analogous way
as part (i) it follows that u˜i is quasi-concave. 
Lemma 4 is used in Theorem 4 below to prove existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4 Let Γ = (v,u) be a dynamic game. If ui is a continuous, increasing and
quasi-concave function for all i ∈ N , if ψ is continuous and
(i) if ψ is transfer-1-concave, then a Nash equilibrium exists in G1(Γ, ψ).
(ii) if ψ is transfer-2-concave and vt ∈ GN is weakly superadditive for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
then a Nash equilibrium exists in G2(Γ, ψ).
Proof. (i) Let ψ be continuous and transfer-1-concave and let ui be a continuous, in-
creasing and quasi-concave function for all i ∈ N . From continuity of ψ and continuity
of ui it follows that u˜i is a continuous function. Since the set Si is compact for all i ∈ N
it follows that SN is compact. A convex combination of strategies in SN is contained in
SN and therefore SN is convex. From Debreu (1952) and Lemma 4 it follows that a Nash
Equilibrium exists in G1(Γ, ψ).
(ii) The proof op part (ii) follows the line of proof of part (i). However, the assumption
that ψ is transfer-1-concave is replaced by the assumption that ψ is transfer-2-concave.
Furthermore let vt ∈ GN be weakly superadditive for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. In an analogous
way as (i) it then follows that a Nash Equilibrium exists in G2(Γ, ψ). 
One of the conditions in Lemma 4 and Theorem 4 is transfer-k-concavity of the solution ψ.
For k ∈ {1, 2}, ψ is transfer-k-concave in case the solution ψ is additive, ψi is increasing in
v(i) for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN and ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Additionally, ψ is transfer-
2-concave if ψ is restrictively additive and ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N . The following example
illustrates that the nucleolus, a restrictively additive solution, is not transfer-1-concave.
Example 3. Consider the game v where v(1) = 0, v(2) = 1, v(3) = 0 and v(12) = 1,
v(13) = 2, v(23) = 1 and v(N) = 6. The first transfer system is used and only transfers
of player 1 are considered. The nucleolus ν(v + α11) can be computed for different values
α and ν(v + 0 · 11) = ν(v) = (134 , 212 , 134), ν(v + 12 · 11) = (2, 212 , 112) and ν(v + 1 · 11) =
(21
3
, 21
3
, 11
3
) are obtained. Take λ = 1
2
and strategies x = 0 and y = 1 for player 1, then
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ν1(λ(v+x11)+(1−λ)(v+y11)) = ν1(12(v+0 ·11)+(1− 12)(v+1 ·11)) = ν1(v+ 12 ·11) = 212 .
However λν1(v + x11) + (1− λ)ν1(v + y11) = 12ν1(v + 0 · 11) + 12ν1(v + 2 · 11) = 2 712 . Since
21
2
 2 7
12
it follows that the nucleolus is not transfer-1-concave.
In Example 3 the cores of the games v + α1i for α ∈ {0, 12 , 1} are nonempty and therefore
the prenucleolus and nucleolus coincide. This means that both solutions are not transfer-1-
concave and thus Theorem 4 cannot be used. In the next example we consider the dynamic
game Γ = (v,u) where the intertemporal utility function ui is continuous and contained
in class V for all i ∈ N . Payoffs are transferred according to the first transfer system and
the solution which is used is restrictively additive. In the example a Nash equilibrium
does not exist. This is consistent with the fact that the nucleolus is not transfer-1-concave
which thereby causes at least one of the utility functions, u˜i for i ∈ N , of the associated
noncooperative game to be not quasi-concave.
Example 4. Consider the dynamic TU-game Γ = (v1, v2;u1, u2, u3), the nucleolus ν and
transfer system k = 1. The game v1 is described as v1(1) = v1(2) = v1(3) = 0, v1(12) =
v1(23) = 1, v1(13) = 2 and v1(N) = 6 and v2 has worths v2(1) = v2(2) = 1, v2(S) = v1(S)
for all S 6= {1}, {2}. Clearly only players 1 and 2 can transfer payoffs between periods
1 and 2, player 3 is just a strategic dummy player. The vectors α = (α1, α2) ∈ S1 and
β = (β1, β2) ∈ S2 contain all possible strategies resulting from transferring payoffs of
respectively player 1 and player 2. Moreover, α1 + α2 = β1 + β2 = 1 and α1, β1 ∈ [0, 1].
The intertemporal utility functions of players 1 and 2 are respectively denoted u1 and u2
and are contained in the set V . In particular u1 and u2 are constant discounted utility
functions with a discount factor equal to one.
Player 1’s utility function u˜1(α, β) of the associated noncooperative game G1(Γ, ν), which
equals by definition u1(ν(v
1 + α111 + β
112), ν(v
2 + α211 + β
212)), is given in Table 2. It
shows for every transfer (β1, 1− β1) of player 2, player 1’s utility.
value of β1 u˜1(α, β)
β1 = 1 if α1 ∈ [0, 12 ] 413 + 112β1 − 16α1
β1 = 1 if α1 ∈ [12 , 1] 413
β1 ∈ (0, 1) if α1 ∈ [0, 12β1] 413 + 112β1 − 16α1
β1 ∈ (0, 1) if α1 ∈ [12 , 12β1 + 12 ] 413
β1 ∈ (0, 1) if α1[12β1 + 12 , 1] 414 + 16α1 − 112β1
β1 = 0 if α1[0, 12 ] 4
1
3
β1 = 0 if α1 ∈ [12 , 1] 414 + 16α1 − 112β1
Table 2: Player 1’s utility function u˜1(α, β).
Player 2’s utility function is given in Table 3. By definition u˜2(α, β) of G1(Γ, ν) is equal to
u2(ν(v
1 + α111 + β
112), ν(v
2 + α211 + β
212)). The table shows for every possible transfer
(α1, 1− α1) of player 1, player 2’s utility.
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value of α1 u˜2(α, β)
α1 ∈ [0, 12 ] if β1 ∈ [0, 2α1] 413
α1 ∈ [0, 12 ] if β1 ∈ [2α1, 1] 413 − 16β1 + 13α1
α1 ∈ [12 , 1] if β1 ∈ [0, 2α1 − 1] 412 + 16β1 − 13α1
α1 ∈ [12 , 1] if β1 ∈ [2α1 − 1, 1] 413
Table 3: Player 2’s utility function u˜2(α, β).
Table 4 shows the reaction functions of player 1 and 2. It contains player 1’s best response
(α1∗, 1−α1∗) against any possible transfer (β1, 1−β1) of player 2 given the utility function
u˜1(α, β) in Table 2. It also contains player 2’s best response (β
1∗, 1−β1∗) for every possible
transfer (α1, 1− α1) of player 1 given u˜2(α, β) in Table 3.
Reaction function player 1 Reaction function player 2
value of β1 best response α1∗ value of α1 best response β1∗
β1 ∈ [0, 12 ] α1∗ = 1 α1 ∈ [0, 12 ] β1∗ ∈ [0, 2α1]
β1 ∈ [12 , 1] α1∗ = 0 α1 ∈ [12 , 1] β1∗ ∈ [2α1 − 1, 1]
Table 4: Player 1’s and 2’s reaction functions.
Player 1 and 2’s reaction functions are displayed in Figure 1, which shows no overlap of
best response sets of both players. Hence, no Nash equilibrium exists.
α1
β1
0 1
1
II.
I.b
I.a
Figure 1: Best response sets of players 1 and 2. Player 1’s best response set consists of parts I.a
and I.b, player 2’s best response set consists of part II.
The notion of Nash equilibrium has a number of limitations. In the next section one of
these shortcomings is considered.
4 Pareto optimality
A drawback of Nash equilibrium is that it is not immune to coalitional deviations. As
a result Pareto optimality of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. In this section Nash
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equilibria in weakly dominant strategies are considered where players transfer as much
payoff as possible to time period 1. It is shown in which cases these equilibria are weakly
and strongly Pareto optimal. A strategy profile α∗ ∈ SN is weakly Pareto optimal if there
exists no strategy profile α ∈ SN such that u˜i(α) > u˜i(α∗) for all i ∈ N . A strategy profile
α∗ ∈ SN is strongly Pareto optimal if there exists no strategy profile α ∈ SN such that
u˜i(α) ≥ u˜i(α∗) for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality.
In the next theorem the noncooperative game G2(Γ, ψ) is considered where ψ is restrictively
additive and ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 5 Let Γ = (v,u) be a dynamic game, let vt ∈ GN be weakly superadditive for
all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, let ψ be restrictively additive and let ψi(z) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
(i) If ui ∈ V for all i ∈ N , then the strategy profile that contains for every i ∈ N strategy(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is weakly Pareto optimal in G2(Γ, ψ).
(ii) If ui ∈ V¯ for all i ∈ N , then the strategy profile that contains for every i ∈ N strategy(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) is strongly Pareto optimal in G2(Γ, ψ).
Proof. (i) Let ui ∈ V for all i ∈ N . Since ψ is restrictively additive and for all i ∈ N it holds
that ψi(z) = 0 and ui ∈ V it follows from Theorem 3(i) that
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i))
for all i ∈ N is a Nash equilibrium in G2(Γ, ψ). Moreover, because ui ∈ V this Nash
equilibrium is weakly Pareto optimal, since for every player i ∈ N it holds that strategy(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) generates player i’s maximum utility independent of other
players strategies.
(ii) Let ui ∈ V¯ for all i ∈ N . Since ψ is restrictively additive and for all i ∈ N it holds that
ψi(z) = 0 and ui ∈ V¯ it follows from Theorem 3(ii) that
(∑T
t=2 v
t(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i))
for all i ∈ N is a unique Nash equilibrium in G2(Γ, ψ). Because ui ∈ V¯ for every player
i ∈ N it holds that strategy (∑Tt=2 vt(i),−v2(i), . . . ,−vT (i)) yields player i his strictly
highest level of utility independent of other players strategies, which means that this Nash
equilibrium is strongly Pareto optimal. 
The nucleolus as well as the Shapley value are restrictively additive and satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 5. In the case where we consider noncooperative game G1(Γ, ψ) it
is not clear if Nash equilibria where as much as possible is transferred to the first time
period are Pareto optimal. Another interesting point to consider is whether the above
mentioned Nash equilibria are strong Nash equilibria. A strong Nash equilibrium is im-
mune to all coalitional deviations and is defined as a strategy combination α∗ ∈ SN , such
that for all coalitions M ⊆ N and all αM ∈ SM there exists a player i ∈ M such that
u˜i(αM , α
∗
N\M) < u˜i(α
∗). With respect to strong Nash equilibria we did not find a general
result.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper it is assumed that players can only make individual intertemporal transfers.
Kranich et al. (2000) mention briefly the influence of an aggregate transfer, which they
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define as a transfer of payoffs of a coalition of players, S with |S| ≥ 2, which increases
the worth of S at time t, vt(S), and decreases the worth of S at time t′, vt
′
(S). Further
research could look at the role of aggregate transfers in dynamic games. Another limitation
of the model is its impossibility to transfer more payoff than the worth of the individual
coalition. It is only possible for an individual to borrow from his own future. However, in
real life situations an individual can take out a mortgage and go bankrupt. Other research
could look at a possible extension of the model developed by Filar and Petrosjan (2000)
to include transfers.
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